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Robison and Yoder: School Finance Reforms for Ohio

SCHOOL FINANCE REFORMS FOR OHIO
INTRODUCTION

problems currently facing the State of Ohio
O is its inability to critical
properly finance its 617' school districts. The pracNE OF THE MOST

tical aspects of the problem indicate that one area of concern is the inability to make the current basic state support funding system, known as
the Foundation Program,2 operative. This failure has been illustrated by
the increasing number of schools that have been forced to temporarily
close their operations in recent years, the significant number of school
districts that have sought state aid from the Emergency Loan Fund established by by the General Assembly in 1978, and the various legislative
proposals for reforming the current program that have been introduced
and have occupied time on the floor of the General Assembly.
Statistics of school closings in recent years indicate that in 1976,
seventeen Ohio school districts were forced to apply to the State Auditor
for closing audits due to insufficient funds to keep their schools open.8
Seven "audit" districts actually closed their schools for varying times." As
of November 16, 1977, fifty-one districts had applied to the State Auditor
for closing audits in 1977 due to acute shortages of funds.5 Thirty-three
of these districts were certified by the Auditor to have a deficit if they completed the school year,' and eleven districts were recognized as having to
close unless a new levy or other additional funds were obtained before
the year's end." In actuality, fifteen school districts ended up closing
in 1977! The Auditor estimated that if these districts had completed the
year without closing, their total deficits would have amounted to
$37,461,371.84.1 In 1978, the school district closings were limited to four,
while an additional ten school districts avoided the necessity of closing by
receiving aid from the State Emergency Loan Fund.1" These statistics
emphasize the serious impact of the current funding problem.
Coupled with these practical aspects of the funding problem is the
I Board of Educ. of Cincinnati v. Walter, No. A 7602725, slip op. at 43 (Hamilton County
C.P. Ct., Ohio, Nov. 21, 1977).
2 Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 3317 (Page 1972 & Supp. 1978).

3 Board of Educ. of Cincinnati v. Walter, No. A 7602725, slip op. at 57.
4 Id. at 58.
5
1d. at 63.
'id.
7 d. at 68.
s Telephone interview with Roger Lulow, Executive Director for Administration, Ohio Dept.
of Education (Feb. 12, 1979).
9 Board of Educ. of Cincinnati v. Walter, No. A 7602725, slip op. at 69.
10 Lulow, supra note 8, at 2.
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case of Board of Education of Cincinnati v. Walters," which is currently
before the Ohio Supreme Court, and which challenges the constitutionality
of the Foundation Program under both the Ohio Constitution's Equal
Protection Clause 1 2 and its Thorough and Efficient Clause. 3 Although both
the Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas1" and the Court of Appeals held the Foundation Plan unconstitutional.15 However, the Court of
Common Pleas based its decision on the program's violation of both constitutional clauses, while the Court of Appeals held that the Foundation
Program was unconstitutional solely as a violation of the equal protection
provisions of Ohio's Constitution. Regardless of the Ohio Supreme Court's
decision in this case, it is evident that Ohio is in immediate need of
alternate solutions to its public school financing problems.
This comment will first examine the legal rationale of the leading
court decisions concerned with the constitutionality of educational funding
programs. Secondly, the advantages and disadvantages of current funding
programs, as well as Ohio's present program, will be discussed. An analysis
of the guidelines set by the Ohio courts, and a discussion of what is wrong
with Ohio's current plan will follow. Finally, proposals for solving Ohio's
problems will be offered.
CHALLENGES IN THE COURT

Ohio is not alone in its school finance dilemma. The first challenges
to state programs of public school finance emerged elsewhere in the late
1960's based on alleged violations of the Equal Protection Clause of the
fourteenth amendment. Early cases in Illinois"0 and Virginia" were unsuccessful because the plaintiffs' claims were based on the educational
needs of the students. The rationale applied was that "only a financing
system which apportions public funds according to the educational needs
of the students satisfies the fourteenth amendment." 8 The courts ruled
that no discoverable and manageable standards existed to evaluate whether
the United States Constitution had been violated. Also, the plaintiff's
claim in Mclnnis v. Shapiro9 that the state financing statutes resulted in
wide district variations in expenditures per pupil violated the fourteenth

112 10

Ohio Op. 3d 26 (Hamilton County Ct. App. 1978).

1 Omo

13
14

CoNST. art. I, § 2.

Omo CONST. art. VI, § 2.

Board of Educ. of Cincinnati v. Walter, No. A 7602725, slip op.

15 10 Ohio Op. 3d at 26.
16 McInnis v. Shapiro, 293 F. Supp. 327 (N.D. Ill.1968), aff'd sub nom. mem. McInnis v.
Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 322 (1969).
17 Burruss v. Wilkerson, 310 F. Supp. 572 (W.D. Va. 1969), alJ'd mem. 397 U.S. 44 (1970).
18 293 F. Supp. at 331.
191d. at 335,
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amendment's Equal Protection Clause was rejected by the court."0 The
plaintiffs had failed to prove that the unequal classifications made by the
statute were wholly irrelevant to a valid state purpose.2 ' Instead, the court
felt that the state's desire to allow the local districts to decide the amount
of education they wanted to provide was a valid state purpose, and sufficient to support the resulting unequal classifications of students.22
A challenge to a state's program for public school financing was
successful in the 1971 California case of Serrano v. Priest.2" This class
action was based on both federal"4 and state2 ' equal protection clauses.
The California system was held to be violative of both because the "system
discriminates on the basis of the wealth of a district and its residents.""0
The court, citing Brown v. Board of Education,2 held education to be
a fundamental right.2 ' In Brown, the fiscal neutrality theory2 9 was adopted
as the standard for equality of educational opportunity. 0 This theory
prohibits a state's wealthier districts from spending more for education
because of their greater property wealth than the poorer districts spend,
and is based on the assumption that equal dollars spent for education in each
district will result in an equal quality of education for all students in all
districts. 8
After the success of this California case, lawsuits challenging school
financing plans, and relying on the Serrano decision, were filed in a majority
of the states. By 1973, nine other state courts had ruled their state plans
unconstitutional as violations of the fourteenth amendment's Equal Protection Clause."2
20 Id.
21

Id.at 333-34.

22 Id.
235 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971).
24

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.

25 CA.. CONST. art. I, §§ 11, 21.

20 Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 615, 487 P.2d 1241, 1263, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601, 623 (1971).
27347 U.S. 483 (1954).
28
29

5 Cal. 3d at 609, 487 P.2d at 1258, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 618.

See generally J. COONS, W. CLUNE, & S. SUGARMAN, PRIVATE WEALTH AND PUBLIc EDUcA-

TION (1970).
30 5 Cal. 3d at 598-603, 487 P.2d at 1250-54, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 610-14 (1971).
31 See generally J. COONS, supra note 29.

32 Rodriguez v. San Antonio Independent School Dist., 337 F. Supp. 280 (W.D. Tex. 1971),
rev'd, 411 U.S. 1 (1973); Van Dusartz v. Hatfield, 334 F. Supp. 870 (D. Minn. 1971);
Sweetwater County Planning Comm. v. Hinkle, 491 P.2d 1234 (1971), juris. relinquished,

493 P.2d 1050 (Wyo. 1972); Parker v. Mandel, 344 F. Supp. 1068 (D. Md. 1972); Hollins
v. Shofstall, Civ. No. C-253652 (Ariz. Super. Ct., June 1, 1972), rev'd, 110 Ariz. 88, 515

P.2d 590 (1973); Caldwell v. Kansas, Civ. No. 50616 (Johnson County Dist. Ct., Kan.,
Aug. 30, 1972); Milliken v. Green, 389 Mich. 1, 203 N.W.2d 457 (1972), vacated, 390 Mich.
389, 212 N.W.2d 711 (1973); Robinson v. Cahill, 118 N.J. Super. 223, 287 A.2d 187 (1972),
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In 1973, one of these nine cases, San Antonio Independent School
District v. Rodriguez,3" reached the United States Supreme Court. This
decision upheld the Texas school finance system by employing a rational
basis test for equal protection evaluation. " Because the Court held that
education was not a fundamental right under the federal Constitution,
and found that the classification of students by the district's property
wealth was not suspect,"
the classification was presumed valid.'
There was no need to examine the Texas financing system under
the strict scrutiny test of the Equal Protection Clause."8 Applying the
rational basis standard, that a rational relationship exists between the state
objective and the challenged classification, the Court ruled that the Texas
system rationally furthered the state's legitimate purpose of providing
local control of the state's school districts, 9 and that this purpose justified
sustaining interdistrict disparities in per pupil expenditures." The Court
based its holding that education is not a fundamental right on the
rationale that it is neither a right expressly stated in the Constitution, nor
an implicit right arising from the close relationship of such explicitly
guaranteed rights as free speech and voting. The majority opinion stated:
"Education, of course, is not among the rights afforded explicit protection
under our Federal Constitution . . . . As we have said, the undisputed
importance of education will not alone cause the Court to depart from
the usual standard for reviewing a State's social and economic legislation.""
The holding that no suspect classification existed here resulted from the
Court's reasoning that the class of poor discriminated against was not
discernible, and that the deprivation of education was not absolute
since students continued to receive some education.' The Court's majority
used a minimum adequacy standard holding the Texas funding system
valid. Since every student in the state is provided an education that meets
minimum standards, no deprivation was seen to exist.," But, as the dissent
by Justice Marshall pointed out, the majority failed to specify any guidesupplemented in 119 N.J. Super. 40, 289 A.2d 569 (1972),

aff'd as modified, 62 N.J. 473,

303 A.2d 273 (1973); Spano v. Board of Educ. of Lakeland Cent. School Dist. No. 1, 68
Misc. 2d 804, 328 N.Y.S. 2d 229 (Sup. Ct. 1972).
83411 U.S. 1 (1973).
S4 Id. at 47-54.
35

Id. at 35.

26 Id. at 28.
BT
38

Id.
Id. at 40.

39 Id. at 49-55.
40 Id.

,1Id.at 35.
,2Id. at 25.
"3 Id. at 24.
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lines for determining what type of expenditure would meet the minimum
standards for adequacy."
The result of the Supreme Court's decision of Rodriguez did not
absolutely prevent the possibility that a state school financing system may
be unconstitutional under the fourteenth amendment. The Court's decision
applied only to the facts in the Rodriguez case. Under the decision, it still
seems possible that, if a readily identifiable class or an absolute deprivation
could be proved to exist under a funding system in a subsequent case, the
Court would apply the compelling state interest test under the fourteenth
amendment's Equal Protection Clause, and the funding system would more
likely fail under this stricter scrutiny."
Following the Rodriguez case, the number of federal constitutional challenges to state financing systems decreased, and the remaining cases turned to
the state constitutions for relief. All states except Colorado, Delaware,
Mississippi, and Montana have equal protection provisions in their constitutions. " Cases in Michigan, Arizona, and California centered their
attacks on these clauses. When a question was presented to the Michigan
Supreme Court on certification of a trial court case, the court held education
to be a fundamental right under the state constitution." Furthermore, it
found that this fact, coupled with the Equal Protection Clause required that
the state system of public school finance provide equal maintenance and
financial support to all its districts."' Since the challenged system failed
to so provide, it was ruled unconstitutional under the Michigan Constitution."8 A year later, however, the court vacated its earlier decision because
by the time the case reached the Michigan Supreme Court on appeal, the
Michigan legislature had taken sufficient steps toward reforming Michigan's
public school financing system to render the case moot.
In the Arizona case, Shofstall v. Hollins,5" the Arizona Supreme Court
refused to expand the state's equal protection clause beyond the interpretation given by the United States Supreme Court to the fourteenth amendment's Equal Protection Clause."' The system was upheld as con"4Id. at 89 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
45 Comment, An Analysis and Review of School FinancingReform, 44 FoRpwAM L. REv. 773,

783-84 (1976); Note, 27 RuToERs L. REv. 773, 785 (1976).
" Project, An Analysis and Review of School Financing Reform, 44 FoRDHM L. REv. 773,

785 (1976).
47 Governor v. State Treasurer, 389 Mich. 1, 27, 203 N.W.2d 457, 469 (1972), vacated, 390
Mich. 389, 212 N.W.2d 711 (1973).
48 1d. at 30-33, 203 N.W.2d at 470-71.
49 MICH. CONST. art. L § 2.
50 110 Ariz. 88, 515 P.2d 590 (1973).
51 Id. at 90, 515 P.2d at 592.
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stitutional, with the Arizona Supreme Court recognizing that the Arizona
Constitution expressly guaranteed a basic right to education; however,
this basic right could be met by any system of education that was "rational,
reasonable, and neither discriminatory nor capricious."5 This position
taken by the Arizona Court regarding its equal protection clause seems
to be the general trend in most states.
However, when the California case of Serrano v. Priest" was remanded
to the trial court after the Rodriguez case, California continued to hold
its financial system unconstitutional based on the equal protection clause
of the California Constitution. " This decision was upheld by the California
Supreme Court which noted the similarities between the Equal Protection
Clause of the fourteenth amendment and that of California's Constitution,
but which refused to have the federal provision's interpretation control
the applicability of the similar state provision.5 Regarding the two equal
protection provisions, the California court stated that "they are possessed
of an independent vitality which, in a given case, may demand an analysis
different from that which would obtain if only the federal standard were
applicable."5 " The California Supreme Court found education to be a
fundamental right under the California Constitution, not because it was
expressly stated as such in the state constitution, but because education
is one of "those individual rights and liberties which lie at the core of
our free and representative form of government, [and] are properly considered 'fundamental.' "5 The court thus applied a compelling state interest
standard to the financial system resulting in the system being held unconstitutional.
Connecticut, in Horton v. Meskill 8 affords a third example of a state
supreme court holding its existing financial scheme violative of the equal
protection clause of that state's constitution. Again, education was held
to be a fundamental right under either the Rodriguez or Serrano tests for
fundamental rights.5 9 The Connecticut Constitution provides: "There shall
always be free public elementary and secondary schools in the state. The
general assembly shall implement this principal by appropriate legislaThis, the court held, mandated education to be a fundamental
tion. "'
52 Id. at 90, 515 P.2d at 592.

Is No. 938, 254 (Los Angeles County Super. Ct., Cal., Apr. 10, 1974).
5IId.
55 Serrano v. Priest, 18 Cal. 3d 728, 768, 557 P.2d 929, 952, 135 Cal. Rptr. 345, 368 (1977).
56 Id. at 764, 557 P.2d at 950, 135 Cal. Rptr. 366.
57 Id. at 767-68, 557 P.2d at 952, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 368.
5s 172 Conn. 615, 642-46, 376 A.2d 359, 373-74 (1977).
59 Id. at 646, 376 A.2d at 373.
60 CoNN. CONST. art. VIII, § 1.
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right.6 " The Connecticut Supreme Court applied strict judicial scrutiny of
the financial program, and found it unconstitutional since alternative means
were available to achieve the state objective of local control of education
resulting in less interference with the fundamental right to education than
the current financing plan provided.62
In addition to equal protection provisions, "almost all state constitutions contain an express provision guaranteeing a free public education,
although the language varies from state to state."," Eight states, including
Ohio, have statutes requiring a "thorough and efficient" system of public
schools.6" Seven states have either "thorough" or "efficient" provisions.6 5
Eight states provide for a "general and uniform" public school system,
while ten more states require either a "general" or a "uniform" school
system.6 These education clauses have also been used as a basis for
challenging public school financing programs.
One such successful attempt occurred in New Jersey only two weeks
after the Rodriguez case was decided. In Robinson v. Cahill," the New
Jersey Supreme Court held the state system of school finance unconstitutional because it violated the Thorough and Efficient provisions of the New
Jersey Constitution. 68 The court interpreted the Thorough and Efficient
Clause as requiring equal educational opportunities for all students in the
public school system in the state. Furthermore, "the Constitution's guarantee
must be understood to embrace that educational opportunity which is
needed in the contemporary setting to equip a child for his role as a citizen
and as a competitor in the labor market."6 9 The New Jersey financing plan
relied heavily on local revenue from property taxes resulting in large
disparities in per pupil expenditures due to the unequal property of the
school districts. 0 Due to this disparity, the system was held violative of
the Thorough and Efficient clause of New Jersey's Constitution."' Thus,
this New Jersey case provided an alternative avenue of challenge to state
programs for financing public schools by relying on the education clauses
of the state constitutions in addition to their equal protection provisions.
61 172 Conn. 615, 647-48, 376 A.2d 359, 374 (1977).
62

Id. at 648-53, 376 A.2d at 374-76.

63

Levin, Current Trends in School Finance Reform Litigation: A Commentary, 1977 DuKB

LJ. 1099, 1103 (1977).
4

Id.

65

Id.

" Id.
67
N.J. 473, 303 A.2d 273 (1973).
68
Id. at 508-19, 303 A.2d at 291-97. See also N.J. CONST. art. VIII, § 4,
69 Robinson v. Cahill, 62 N.J. 473, 515, 303 A.2d 273, 295 (1973).
70 ld. at 480-81, 303 A.2d at 276-77.
71Id. at 508-19, 303 A.2d at 291-97.
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The Idaho Constitution requires that the legislature "establish and
maintain a general, uniform and thorough system of public, free common
schools." 2 Based on this provision, an attack on Idaho's funding plan was
held unconstitutional by the trial court. The Idaho Supreme Court reversed the lower court's ruling, however, stating that the enactment of a
foundation plan by the state legislature satisfied the constitutional requirement that the legislature establish and maintain a system of public schools.7
The court felt that the general and uniform system did not require equal
dollar expenditure per pupil, but failed to indicate whether the clause
"
mandated equal educational opportunity measurable in any other manner.
It failed to define the clause's requirements. This point disturbed the dissent
which agreed with the majority that the general and uniform clause did
not mandate equal dollar expenditure per pupil,75 but interpreted the
clause as mandating a system which is fiscally neutral - one that may
vary educational expenditures for any reason other than the wealth of the
school district." Here, the disparities in property wealth in the districts
resulted in a plan that had inherent biases favoring one group over another
in violation of the fiscal neutrality theory.
The "general and uniform" requirement for public school systems
also appears in the Washington Constitution." In Northshore School Dis8 as in Thompson, the Washington Supreme Court
trict No. 417 v. Kinnear,"
upheld the state financing scheme even though substantial disparities among
per pupil expenditures were found to exist.7 9 The Washington Supreme
Court interpreted "a general and uniform of public schools"8 to mean:
one in which every child in the state has free access to certain minimum and reasonably standardized educational and instructional facilities and opportunities to at least the twelfth grade - a system administered with that degree of uniformity which enables a child to transfer
from one district to another within the same grade . . . and with
access by each student ... to acquire those skills . . .that are reasonaly understood to be fundamental and basic to a sound education.81
Oregon followed Washington's interpretation of a uniform system of
12

IDAHo CONST. art. IX, § 1.

73 Thompson v. Engelking, 96 Idaho 793, 815, 537 P.2d 635, 652-53 (1975).
T4 Id. at 828, 537 P.2d at 668 (Donaldson, J., dissenting).
TO id.
Ts

Id.

IX, § 2.
Is 84 Wash. 2d 685, 530 P.2d 178 (1974).
TO Id.at 696-98, 530 P.2d at 185-86.
80 WASH. CONST. art. IX, § 2.
82 84 Wash. 2d at 729, 530 P.2d at 202.
I WASH. CONST. Art.
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public education, and stated that the constitutional provision was satisfied
when the state "provided for a minimum of educational opportunities in
the district and permits the districts to exercise local control over what
they desire, and can furnish, over the minimum."82 Based on this rationale,
the Oregon Supreme Court upheld that state's public school financing
program.8"
Washington's system of financing education has been held unconstitutional by a trial court in a recent case, Seattle School District No. I v.
Washington. " This holding was based on a provision of the Washington
Constitution which requires the state to make "ample provision for the
education of all children residing within its borders."8
Since the Rodriguez decision in 1973, only two cases, Robinson and
Horton, have been successful in their attacks on school finance systems
based upon education clauses in state constitutions. Relying upon equal
protection provisions of state constitutions, two cases, Horton and Serrano,
have proven successful. Additionally, three state supreme courts, Idaho
(Thompson), Oregon (Olsen), and Washington (Northshore), have held that
neither the education clauses nor the equal protection clauses have been
violated by their current state programs for financing public education,
even though the programs result in substantial variance in the amount of
dollars spent per pupil from district to district within the same state.
CLASSIFYING PLANS

All states have recognized an obligation to aid local school districts
in financing. Some public education is required by every state except
Mississippi.88 The problem that has arisen is, what type of funding program
should the state implement? State grant distributions have been classified
into variable equalizing, variable nonequalizing, and fixed grants.87
A variable equalizing program is designed to reduce the wealth
disparity between a low property wealth district and a high property wealth
district by providing greater state support where there is less local wealth.88
Under a variable nonequalizing program, the state agrees to pay
some percentage of local cost generally for a specified program.8 8 Cate82

Olsen v. State, 276 Ore. 9, 27, 554 P.2d 139, 148 (1976).

83 Id. at 27, 554 P.2d at 149.
84 Civ. No. 53950 (Thurston County Super. Ct., Wash., Jan. 14, 1977)
85
Id., slip op. at 24-28. See also WAsH CONST. art. IX, § 1.
8 8

UNITE

STATES DEPT. OF HEALTH,

EDuc. AND WELFARE, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVI-

SIONS AND LEGISLATIVE MATERIAL RELATING TO PUBLIC SCHOOL FINANCE (1973).
87

WISE, RICH SCHOOLS, POOR SCHOOLS 130 (1968).

" Id.
89 Id.
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gorical program supports for gifted children and vocational education
whereby the school district furnishes a portion of the support are examples
of this type of plan. If a school district does not or cannot provide its
share for the program, the district will not receive the state grant. Variable
nonequalizing grants probably increase wealth disparity between districts
because it is likely that a greater number of poorer districts will fail to
qualify for them.
Fixed grants are given to a district generally on a per pupil basis for
either a general or specific purpose regardless of the district's need for aid. 0
Commentators have noted that an increase in the level of state aid
regardless of the state aid formula employed results in a decrease of the
inequality in total expenditures."' Generally, it is the increase in level of
state support rather than the type of formula which determines the equalizing
effect of state aid. 2
If adequately funded and properly implemented, each of the current
funding methods would appear to reduce disparities between districts.
However, as the result of community pressures and lobbying efforts, the
plans have tried to provide some state financing for everyone. In every state
in which this trend occurs to the extent of state guarantees to districts, the
system has become "substantially disequalized."'
Under a pure state foundation program, the state legislature would
establish an amount which it considers sufficient to adequately fund an
adequate education. Local communities would then be required to tax
at a certain specified rate in order to qualify for state funds. If in applying
the rate the local district is unable to raise the difference between the
foundation amount and the state guaranteed level, the state will make
up the difference.
The result is that state aid becomes a variable grant which is provided
in an inverse relationship to the assessed valuation of the district. This
system became known as the Strayer-Haig" formula for calculating school
aid. Under this program, unless the state's guaranteed amount is the equivalent of the amount the wealthiest district would obtain at the specified
rate, inequalities between districts will still exist. An alternative means
g0d.
91 Michelson, Reform through State Legislatures, 38 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 436, 444 (1974).

[hereinafter cited as Alternative Reforms]. See also Killalea Assoc., School Finance Reform
in the Seventies: Achievements & Failures in SELECTED PAPERS ON SCHOOL FINANCE REFORM IN 1978 68 (1978). [hereinafter cited as School FinanceReform.]
92 Id.

93 Board of Educ. v. Walter, No. A 7602725, slip op. at 19 (1977).
94 Id.at 18. See also W. N. GRUBB & S. MICHELSON, STATES & SCaOOLS 160-71 (1974).
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of completely eliminating wealth disparities would be to set the guaranteed
amount at an adequate level of funding. If wealthier districts taxing at
the same rate receive more than the guaranteed amount, they would be
required to pay the excess to the state. This excess repayment would be
used for financing poorer districts.
The second major financing program has been termed district power
equalizing (DPE).11 Under this type of plan, each district is allowed to
set its own tax rate thus preserving local control over budgeting."6 The
state then sets an amount which the state guarantees each district if it
applies a given rate. If in applying a given tax rate the district does not
obtain revenues equal to the amount guaranteed by the district, the state
will make up the difference. In the ideal form of this plan, the local districts which tax at the same rate will have equal revenue available for
spending regardless of the underlying property wealth of the district. As
in the foundation plan, in order to achieve absolute equality, the state
would either be required to set the guaranteed amount at the level which
the property wealthiest district could raise or require those districts raising
excess revenues at the given rate to remit the excess to the state. Wisconsin
had adopted this type of "negative aid."97 Under this state's program, each
local district was permitted to set any level rate it chose; however, if in
applying the rate to the district's property value greater revenues were
raised, the excess over the state set figure would be diverted to the state
to finance poorer property wealth districts.
The constitutionality of this statute was successfully challenged in
the Wisconsin state court. 8 One implication of this decision is that this
case represents the point beyond which at least the Wisconsin judicial
branch will refuse to allow state legislators to go in achieving equalized
education opportunity.
In Florida, Maine, Montana, and Utah, revenues must be paid to
the state if proceeds from the required tax rate exceed permitted expenditures. 9 Furthermore, Montana's recapture provision has been upheld
as a "statewide uniform property tax" levied for a public purpose rather
95 J.CooNs, supra note 29 at 202-03.
9
01d. Proponents of DPE saw local control as the chief advantage of DPE over other forms
of budgeting. Compare Note, Texan School Finance: The Incompatibility of Property Taxation & Quality Education, 56 Tax. L. REV. 253 (1978) and School Finance Reform, supra
note 91.
OT WISc. STAT. ANN. § 121.08 (2), (3) (West Supp. 1976-1977).
9
8 Buse v. Smith, 74 Wis. 2d 550, 247, N.W.2d 141 (1976). See also Note, 90 HiARv. L. REV.

1528, 1530 (1977) for discussion of the conflict between Wisconsin's constitutional provisions
and the holding in this case.

99 School Finance Reform, supra note 91, at 81, 87, 91, 97.
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than a tax levied on one district for the sole benefit of another.'0 0 Proportional benefits are not a constitutional requirement for a tax which
benefits the state as a whole.' 0 Although DPE proponents view local control as a necessary element of school financing,' as do some state conthe critics attack local control as allowing the
stitutional provisions,'
individual taxpayer the right to determine the quality of education the
children of the community will receive." Although district wealth is
eliminated under the ideal DPE system, the adult community's prejudices
and preferences are still the most important characteristic in determining
the quality of education in the local community.
"Once the state has the funds, adult favoritism should play no role,
and only the characteristics of the child should be recognized."'0 5 Under
this view, parents as individuals may compensate their children beyond
what the state provides, but the state is limited to differentiating among
children only as to the child's needs. The notion that the quality of the
child's education cannot depend on the willingness of the district's voters
to tax themselves was introduced by the Ohio lower courts' decision.' °
Such a position is inconsistent with a plan based upon a district power
equalizer.
The third type of plan is a flat grant. Under this plan, the state
designates a certain amount of funds to be provided each pupil within
the district regardless of the financial needs of the district. Connecticut's
declared unconstitutional by the state supreme court
flat grant program was
07
in Horton v. Meskill.
If the state's flat grant is high enough to provide an adequate education for all children in the state, such a state program becomes almost
indistinguishable from full state funding which is another popular alternative.
If a state were to adopt a full funding program, it may under one view
still allow local option to provide enriching programs within the district.
04

oWoodahl v. Straub, 164 Mont. 141, 148, 520 P.2d 776, cert. denied, 419 U.S. 845 (1974).

10" Id. at 151.
0

2 GOVERNOR J. RHODES, A PROPOSAL FOR IMPROVING THE QUALITY
OHio 3 (1979). See also Note 90, HARv. L. REv. 1528 (1977).
103 WISC. CONST. art. X, § 4.
1

OF PUBLIC EDUCATION IN

104 Michelson, supra note 91, at 440.
205 Id.

of Educ. of Cincinnati v. Walter, No. A 7602725, slip op.
See notes 58-62 and accompanying text, supra.
Connecticut has since adopted a modified equalization grant under which each district is
guaranteed a tax base at the 85% level of all districts in the state. The wealth base is
calculated on a combined per capita and per pupil basis. CONN. Gm. STAT. ANN. § 10-262 C
(West. Supp. 1978).
3o0 Board

107 172 Conn. 615, 376 A.2d 359 (1977).

https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol12/iss4/8

12

Robison and Yoder: School Finance Reforms for Ohio
COMMENT

Spring, 19791

The other view would require absolute spending equality between districts
in order to meet the desired standard.
Only the State of Hawaii has currently adopted a full funding plan.1" 8
In Hawaii, education is a full state service providing both administrative
and operational responsibilities for education. Under such a system,
teachers, principals, and other school district employees would be employed by the state. An alternative to the completely unitary school system
as established in Hawaii would be to establish a system whereby the state
collected and distributed revenues, but local boards of education would
retain responsibility for operating the school. Local control over district
spending is not necessarily incompatible with centralized financing.' 9
Another alternative within the full state funding scheme is the voucher
system. Although no state presently follows such a program, the Office
of Economic Opportunity has encouraged school systems to adopt this
plan."' Under such a program, the state would assume responsibility for
raising all public money, and then would distribute vouchers to each
family who could use the voucher in any public or private school of its
choice. If the parents so desired, they could supplement the voucher with
additional moneys of their own. Proponents of this plan believe that the
educational system will be improved by the increased competition for
students."' The basic problem, however, is that educational quality will
become a product of individual wealth rather than community wealth.
Those who can afford to spend more will receive greater opportunities
than those who cannot.
An alternative voucher system would attempt to equalize family
expenditures by offering a guaranteed amount based on a percent of the
families' income." 2 For example, if the state guaranteed that every family
devoting one percent of its income to education would receive $2,000,
a family earning $30,000 would receive no state aid, and a family earning
$5,000 would receive $1,950. This plan is subject to one weakness which
is also applicable to other equalization plans, such as foundation programs
and DPEs. It is that poorer families require a greater portion of their
income for necessities leaving available a smaller percentage of their money
108 HAw. REV. STAT.

§ 298 (1978).

109 Levin, Muller, Scanlon & Cohen, Public School Finance: Present Disparities & Fiscal
Alternatives, 38 L. & CoNTEmP. PROB. 212-43 (1974).
210 R. REISCHAUER & R. HARTMAN, REFORMING SCHOOL FINANCE 78 (1973): See also, OEA
Has One Legislative Priority--School Funding, 1 OHI SCHOOL 18, 19 (Jan. 1979) urging
Ohio Education Association members to oppose a voucher plan in Ohio.
M11
REISCHAUER & HARTMAN, supra note 110, at 79.
122 Id.
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for education. The family earning $5,000 may need every dollar simply
to survive.
Regardless of which basic program or combination of programs the
state selects, there are other considerations which must be addressed before
an equitable funding plan for reducing disparities may be obtained.
First, the state must define equality.11 It must set the desired level
it wishes to achieve whether absolute or whether along some continuum
ranging from high quality to minimum adequacy. Then the state must
decide whether disparities beyond this standard will be permitted.
Secondly, the state must determine what elements will compose the chosen
standard, that is, whether the standard is equal dollars, dollars based on
needs of the children within the district, costs of operating the district,
resources available and required, and to what extent cost variables between
districts will be considered. Third, if the state is to reduce wealth disparities, an adequate measure of wealth disparity whether based on
property wealth, income, or remaining income after necessities and other
taxes must be determined. Finally, the state must determine whether it
wishes to enact restrictive revenue provisions or expenditures curbs as a
means of reducing disparities. The absence of these restrictions, however,
may allow some districts to implement innovative and exciting programs
that might otherwise not develop in the state. 114 As an alternative, the
state could provide funds for experimental programs.
After each of these considerations are evaluated and the state's policies
towards education are determined, a means for satisfying the desired
policies may be derived.
No state requires absolute equality of education as such would be
impossible to obtain regardless of the standard chosen to measure quality.
Basically two categorical standards have been identified. First, there is the
objective school concept, and secondly, the subjective child performance
concept."' Both of these have been dissected and examined as to the individual components necessary to construct a standard by which to measure
the quality of education.

I's Educators have not been able to agree as to what an equal education entails. See generally
Coleman, The Concept of Equality of Educational Opportunity, 30 HARv. EDuC. REV. 7
(1968); Berne, Alternative Equity and Equality Measures: Does the Measure Make a Difference? in SELECTED PAPERS IN SCHOOL FINANCE REFORM IN 1978 (1978) [hereinafter cited as
Alternative Equity].
114 School Finance Reform, supra note 91, at 72. For examples of this type of legislation, see
discussion related to Florida, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, and New Mexico.
115 J. Coons, supra note 29, at 25.
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol12/iss4/8
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Commentators"l as well as judicial decisions have attempted to
define standards of quality. Each, however, is a variation of the
objective school concept or subjective pupil concept. Simply stated, the
objective school concept involves a measure of the resources put into
the system, and the subjective pupil concept involves measurements of
what the students are achieving generally measured through the use of
some standardized achievement tests. The major difficulties with the later
position include the criticism that such tests do not measure what they
claim to measure, 1 7 and secondly, that other factors such as 1 8home environment influence a pupil's performance on achievement tests.
One suggested application of an objective school standard is a maximum variable ratio which would permit districts to vary expenditures
within a specific range, thereby providing school districts with some flexibility in planning their programs." 9 This position is essentially a compromise position between complete recapture beyond the state guaranteed
level, and allowing wealthier districts to raise and retain all revenues
beyond the state's fixed guarantee. Such a standard assumes the adequacy
of the state's determined amount without providing guidelines as to what
is adequate.
Fiscal neutrality which simply provides that "[t]he quality of education
may not be a function of wealth other than the wealth of the state as a
whole,"' 20 is a second application of the objective school concept. This
standard is applied by proponents of district power equalizing, and as
previously noted, continues to allow the quality of education to be a
product of the communities' willingness to tax themselves. Ohio courts
have, at this point, apparently rejected this standard.
Since money is an easily quantified item, it is the easiest place to
start in defining a standard for equality of educational opportunity.' However, more than mere equality of dollars is necessary to achieve an
equitable system of education since both educational needs of the students
within the district, as well as variations in cost, must be considered. Dollars
alone cannot operate as the sole criterion for determining equal input
118 Wise, supra note 87, at 25. See also McDermott & Klein, The Cost Quality Debate in
School Finance Litigation, 38 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 415 (1974); see generally Alternative

Equity, supra note 113.
117See, e.g., Note, 68 COLUM. L. REv. 691 (1968).
I1s McDermott & Klein, supra note 116, at 420.
119 Project, supra note 46, at 794. This author suggests trying a maximum variable ratio with
a recapture provision under a DPE system.
120 J. CooNs, supra note 29, at 2.
121 See generally McDermott & Klein, supra note 116. The authors contend that if cost and
quality are not related, there would be no meaning or need for local control, and therefore,
no state interest which would validate a system based on local control.
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into the educational system. The total resources which can be obtained
with the dollar serve as the better criterion of providing equal opportunity.
Such concept requires that the state adjust its state aid formula to take
into consideration differences in money cost for providing the same service
in differing districts. Florida has incorporated a cost of living adjustment
into its state aid program."' By using its own consumer price, Florida has
calculated differential costs of living among districts." 3 This type of
approach could effectively reduce many of the problems faced by inner
cities such as higher wages, building and transportation costs, security
problems as well as factors faced by rural districts with such problems as
sparse student populations, widespread geographic locations, and the myriad
other identifiable problems.
Some writers believe that municipal overburden 2 ' should be considered
when distributing state aid.' The converse of this argument is that the
people who live in districts with higher community costs have chosen to
live there because of the extra advantages they receive, and therefore,
are not entitled to additional consideration. One authority adopts the view
that municipal burden is a taxing or revenue collecting issue, and not a
proper consideration for state revenue distributions. 1 Although tax
revenue raising and revenue spending would be separable in a full state
funding program, they are by necessity tied together in a program dependent upon local and state funding particularly12 7where voter choice
determines the rate at which a district will tax itself.
Defining total resources as the measurement tool for determining
equality does not determine the level at which equality is to be achieved,
nor does it consider the need for additional resources where the educational
needs of children differ due to special characteristics of the students,
such as blindness, deafness, giftedness, retardation, and so forth. Both
of these considerations involve value judgments as well as scientific studies
to determine what effect they must be given in arriving at an overall
financing scheme.
The elimination of wealth as a determinant of the quality of education
122

U.S.

DEPT. OF HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE, SELECTED PAPERS ON SCHOOL FINANCE IN

1975 (1975).
123
1

24

See generally School Finance Reform, supra note 91.
The additional taxes that persons living in areas with high costs pay for police protection,

fire protection, recreation, etc.
125 For an example of this type of legislation see Michigan's Equal Yield Program which
contains a municipal overburden provision designed primarily to aid Detroit. MICH. CoMP.
LAws ANN. § 388.1101-388.127 (West 1976).
126 Michelson, supra note 91, at 453.
12T Id. at 457.
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is an element in all reform programs. However, there is much disagreement
as to whether wealth should be measured by the value of property within
a district, or the income of the residents of the district, or perhaps a
combination of the two."2 8 An examination of this problem raises many
issues. First, do high property values automatically indicate high income
which enables the individual to pay the property tax? A negative answer
is obvious in some situations. Districts composed of a large number of
older taxpayers living on valuable properties, but with fixed incomes, may
be unable to pay their taxes; in locations where taxpayers vote their own
millage increases they are unwilling to provide the needed support. One
solution to this problem is to enact "circuit breaker provisions"'12 9 whereby
property tax relief will be granted when the tax rate equals a certain set
percentage of the families' incomes.
A second alternative, however, would be to eliminate the property
tax, and to establish an income tax as the primary means of financing
education. Although property taxes provide the bulk of revenue received
by local governments in the United States, it has serious limitations which
need to be examined." ° The Ohio State Board of Education, however,
considers it neither "unworkable or illegal.""' The primary advantage is
that it is well suited for use by local units of government. Taxpayers can
see direct benefits to their children, and property, being immobile, cannot
be moved to escape taxation.
First, the public has strongly rebelled against increased property tax
as is evidenced by the refusal of many districts to support levy increases. 32
Second, the property tax is regressive."' A person who pays $1,000 in
property tax, who is in the seventy percent marginal tax bracket, ends up
paying only $300, since he is allowed a deduction for an amount which
if taxed would have been taxed at seventy percent. The individual who
does not itemize deductions effectively pays 100% of his property tax. "'
A third problem is its effect on business and industry decisions to locate
in one community over another. The existence of a favorable tax rate may
determine a business location, thus depriving other districts of needed funds.
In Kansas, the matching rate is inversely related to district income as well as considering
property valuation. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 72-7001 to 72-7012 (Supp. 1978).
129 See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN §§ 206.504-206.530 (West 1976).
128

130 NATIONAL EDUCATION FINANCE PROJECT, ALTERNATIVE PROGRAMS FOR FINANCING EDUCATION 61 (1971).
'13 Om1O STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION,
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR LEGISLATIVE CONSIDERATION
TO THE GOVERNOR AND MEMBERS OF THE 113TH GENERAL ASSEMBLY 1 (Dec. 11, 1978).

1s2 Board of Educ. of Cincinnati v. Walters, No. A 7602725, slip op. at 186. See also O'Neill,
Public Views on Taxes & Education in the State of Ohio, 57 (No. 3) Omo SCHOOLS 13
(1979).
"'sNATIONAL EDUCATION FINANCE PROJECT, ALTERNATIVE PROGRAMS, supra note 130, at
253-63 for a formula for measuring progressivity of tax.
"'4 B. BiTrTKmt & L. STONE, FEDERAL INCOME ESTATE & GiFr TAXATION 190 (4th Ed. 1972).
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Neither the Ohio Court nor the state legislature has suggested eliminating the property tax. For the present, the property tax is firmly entrenched as the method for obtaining the local revenues with which to
finance schools." 5
CURRENT FUNDING IN OHIO

Ohio's current school financing system has developed into its present
form from changes which have been effected by legislation passed since
1930. Before then, the real property tax levied by each school district
was the sole source of school revenue. Local school boards financed district schools under authority of the Tax Levy Law.'
The boards of education of each of the school districts in Ohio are
authorized to levy taxes for current operating expenses upon taxable
property located within the school district, and listed on the general tax
lists and duplicates. Taxable property includes all real estate (except that
expressly exempted), and all personal property used in business.""7 Both
constitutional and statutory requirements impose what is commonly called
the "ten mill limitation" upon the board of education's taxing authority.
Ohio's Constitution provides: "[N]o property taxed according to its
value shall be taxed in excess of one percent of its true value in money
for all state and local purposes,"' 38 unless the rate is approved by at least
a majority of the electors of the taxing district voting on such proposition.
Section 5705.02 of the Code limits the total amount of taxes that may be
levied on any taxable property to ten mills on each dollar of tax valuation
(taxable value), unless specifically authorized by the voters thereof. By
applying the millage rate to assessed value rather than true value as authorized by the Ohio Constitution, revenue obtained is less than one-third of
the constitutionally allowed amount.3 9 Since school districts are authorized
by law to levy only a property tax, voter approval must be obtained to raise
property taxes above a ten mill rate if required to meet school operating expenses. Ohio is only one of seven states which requires a referendum on all
40
levies above a certain low rate limitation.'
Prior to 1930, property was the primary source of wealth and income
throughout the state. Beginning in 1935, as a response to the more highly
135

OHIO SCHOOL BOARDs AssOcIATboN POLICY & LEGISLATIVE COMMITrEE, ADEQUATE &
EQUITABLE FUNDING FOR OHIO ScHooLs 3 (July 1978) [hereinafter cited as ADEQUATE &

EQUTrrABLE FUNDING].
136 OHIo
137 Id.

REV. CODE ANN. § 5705 (Page Supp. 1978).

138 OHIO CONST. art. XII,
139 ADEQUATE

§ 2.

& EQurrABLE FUNDING, supra note 135, at 2.

1401I,
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industrialized society, the State introduced a plan for state aid.'' The
State began to provide revenues in the form of modified flat grants per
pupil assuming about 50% of the educational costs. In 1956, the Legislature adopted the first form of a school foundation program, and
established the State Board of Education.' By 1964, the State's portion
of costs had decreased to 30% and by 1970-71 to 28.8%.' s After passage of a state income tax in 1973, the State assumed 35% of the educational costs under the last enactment of the Foundation Program in 1971.""
That law provided each district with the choice of a variable equalizing plan or fixed grant whichever was greater. Basic state aid consisted
of the greater of: (a) allowances for each approved classroom unit of
certain enumerated types of special education classes, and extended service
contracts plus the guaranteed sum of $600 of combined state and local
funds per pupil in average daily membership (ADM). The State's contribution was limited to that portion of amount in excess of a figure
derived by multiplying twenty-five mills times the tax valuation of the
district, or (b) a flat grant sum determined by multiplying the number
of pupils in average daily membership (ADM) times an amount per pupil
fixed by statute on a determined scale. "5 If the district's taxable property
value was greater than $32,000, the district would receive the lowest
figure on the scale, an amount of $75 per pupil.4 6
Responding to increased litigation and successful challenges to the
constitutionality of state funding methods for education in other states,
the Ohio Legislature introduced into its Foundation Program the equal
The formula itself is quite complicated. Simply stated,
yield formula.'
it provides an equal sum of money (local and state combined on a per
pupil per mill basis) for each district in the State. The stated purpose
was "to compensate for disparities between districts in taxable property
wealth."' 8 Unfortunately the plan has not been as successful as its proponents had hoped, Ohio continues to refer to this new program as Ohio's
Foundation Program. Even though a substantially altered program to
that established in 1971, the matching provisions for the first twenty mills
141

OHo DEPARTMENT

OF

EDUCATION,

THE

OHio

LAW

FOR STATE

SUPPORT

OF

PUBLIC

(1978).
142 Board of Educ. of Cincinnati v. Walter, No. A 7602725, slip op. at 19.
143 School Finance Reform, supra note 91, at 95.
144 Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 3317.02 (Page Supp. 1978).

SCHOOLS

145

Id.

" Id.
147
148

OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 3317.022 (Page Supp. 1978).
Omo DEPT. OF EDUCATION, supra note 141, at 4.
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achieve essentially the same result as the traditional Strayer-Haig Foundation Plan.
The present Foundation Program consists of two phases termed
Basic Program Support and Categorical Program Funding. The formula
for calculating basic support is a variation of the school financing technique
labeled district power equalizing. " ' When the formula is fully funded, each
district which levies at least twenty school operating mills is guaranteed
at least $48 per mill per pupil in state and local funds combined. In order
to reward districts for making an extra tax effort over the twenty mills,
for each mill levied by the district between twenty and thirty, the State
guarantees a yield of $42 per mill. 15 0 Therefore, when fully funded, the
State is guaranteeing each district which levies thirty equalized mills
$1,380 per ADM. Both the $48 and the $42 figures have been arbitrarily
chosen by the Legislature. In order to achieve this financial position, the
voters of the district must agree to tax themselves at a rate of thirty
equalized mills. The majority of the voters in each of the 617 school
districts have thus far refused to tax themselves at this rate.
The basic average daily membership, the equalized valuation, and
the equalized millage rate are employed to determine the equalized valuation per pupil and the local yield per pupil per mill. 5' The formula
establishes an arbitrary wealth ceiling of $48,000 per pupil which is lower
52
in fact than the property wealth of some districts in the state.
When fully funded, State Basic Aid under this program will consist of:
1. $48 minus Local Yield Per Pupil Per Mill times basic ADM times
twenty mills;
2. $42 minus Local Yield Per Pupil Per Mill times number of
equalized mills or fractions in excess of twenty mills, but not exceeding thirty mills.
Those districts which can obtain more than $48 per mill are not
required to pay this excess into the State. Without a repayment provision,
this disparity can only be eliminated by setting the per mill guarantee
at the level which the wealthiest district would obtain. 5 Having obtained
Basic State Aid for the current year, each district's current entitlement is
equal to the Basic State Support less fiscal year 1975 Basic State Aid
times the current year phase in percentage plus Basic State Aid for fiscal
149 Id. at 20.
150 Id.

151 Id. at 4-6.

Board of Educ. of Cincinnati v. Walter, No. A 7602725, slip. op. 22.
This type of provision has been declared unconstitutional in Wisconsin. See notes 230-232
and accompanyin# text infra,
152
15s
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year 1975. Basic State Support is the larger of Basic State Aid for fiscal
year 1975 or current entitlement adjusted by certain specified factors
including teacher/pupil ratio, teacher training and experience, and number
of educational service personnel. The negative adjustment provisions
effectively penalize districts which cannot or refuse to comply with mandated
requirements for teacher personnel, administrative personnel, et cetera.
In addition to Basic State Support, each district may be eligible to
receive supplements by implementing certain categorical programs. The
State allocates certain amounts of money for approved units of vocational
students, special education students, and transportation operating expenses'"
An additional subsidy is provided districts in relation to the percentage of the districts' students who receive Aid for Dependent Children
benefits. Disadvantaged Pupil Impact Aid'55 is the only form of categorical
funding which does not consist of a flat grant.
Two rather important features of the formula involve guarantees made
to districts in special circumstances. Under the current system, property
is reappraised during the preceding fiscal year of distribution and the
district is guaranteed the same state payment as it received in the previous
year. When a community's property value is reappraised and adjusted
upward, the millage rate is automatically rolled back so that local revenue
remains the same. However, the school district will not receive state funds
equal to the previously effective millage rate. One example is the Paint
Valley Local District in Rose County which, in enacting a seven mill levy
in June, 1977, brought the district millage rate to thirty."' Following
reappraisal, the 30.0 mill tax rate was rolled back to 20.83. As a result,
Paint Valley District received the same locally collected taxes as it would
have received at thirty mills, but was deprived of the State's guarantee of
$42 per mill between 20.00 and 30.00.
Cincinnati School District offers a further example of the rollback
effect. 5 ' Cincinnati's millage rate was rolled back from 25.94 mills to
24.06 mills. 1" As a result of the increased valuation, the State portion of
the local yield per pupil per mill was reduced in reaching the guaranteed
level of $48 and $42 per mill due to the increased value of the property,
but the eligible mills between twenty and thirty were reduced further reducing State aid. 15 After the one-year period of grace, during which time
1

54 OMo REV. CODE ANN. §
155 Id.
1

3317.024 (Page Supp. 1978).

supra note 131, at 1.
Board of Educ. of Cincinnati v. Walter, No. A 7602725, slip op. at 32.

5 STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION,

157

258 Id.
259

Id.
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the district is guaranteed the same rate it received in the previous year,
the State aid will decrease unless an additional levy is enacted by local vote.
A second guarantee involves school districts which consolidate. For
a period of three years, a district will receive no less money than the
sum the districts received in the year of consolidation."'
School districts will receive the larger of the guarantee or the sum
of basic support plus the total categorical program funding. Such guarantees are called "Save Harmless Provisions" because they result in guaranteeing the same payment in the current year as received in a prior year
regardless of present needs.
CONSTITUTIONAL ATTACK IN OHIO

The challenge of Ohio's Foundation Plan, as advanced in Board of
Education of Cincinnati v. Walters,' follows the two-pronged state constitutional attack employed successfully in the previous cases. The challenge
in the Ohio case is based on two provisions of the Ohio Constitution:
its education clause, which is a "thorough and efficient" type of education
clause, and its equal protection provision.
Ohio's Thorough and Efficient Clause is the equivalent of New Jersey's
clause which was successfully employed in Robinson v. Cahill,'6 2 as a basis
for holding the New Jersey financial system, one similar to Ohio's current
system in revenue sources and resulting disparities in per pupil expenditure
among districts, unconstitutional. The Ohio Constitution provides:
The general assembly shall make such provisions, by taxation, or
otherwise, as, with the income arising from the school trust fund,
will secure a thorough and efficient system of common schools
throughout the state; but no religious or other sect, or sects, shall ever
have any exclusive 6 3right to, or control of, any part of the school
1
funds of this state.
Likewise, the equal protection clause is representative of those found
most
states, and provides that "[a]ll political power is inherent in the
in
people. Government is instituted for their equal protection and benefit."' 64
In the class action of Walters, extensive evidence was presented of
the current funding system: its disparities in per pupil expenditure from
district to district, the causes of these disparities, and viable alternative

60 Omo REv.

CODE

ANN.

§ 3317.04 (Page Supp. 1978).

161 10 Ohio Op. 3d at 26.
102 62 N.J. 473, 303 A.2d 273, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 976 (1973).
6

1 3 OMO

CONST. art. IV,

§ 2.

164 OmIO CONST. art. 1, § 2.
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funding systems available that could result in less inequities.165 After
analyzing the historic development of the system and its current status
in view of the meanings of the Thorough and Efficient Clause and the equal
protection clause, the trial court ruled that the current funding system
violated both provisions of the Ohio Constitution. 66
In its opinion, the trial court, relying on Miller v. Korns'e " and
Powell v. Young,' specifically described the requirements for a thorough
and efficient system of public education:
[T]he Ohio Constitution [holds] the General Assembly to a high
standard of accountability in the provision it makes for financing
public elementary and secondary education. That responsibility is
unmistakeably that of the General Assembly. In discharging it, the
Legislature's concern must be statewide, not local. The General
Assembly must upbuild a system of schools throughout the state.
It must attain thoroughness and efficiency in that system. The constitutional standard is not met if any number of school districts are
starved for funds, or lack teachers, buildings, or equipment. Moreover,
the General Assembly must anticipate that the greatest expense may
arise in the poorest districts, presumably in the cities, and must allocate
resources to meet those expenses. Above all, our state has a commitment not merely to provide minimal educational opportunities, but to
maintain the finest public school system possible in order to train
youth for citizenship in a free government.'
Additionally, the Court cites legislation in 1956 by the Ohio General
Assembly as supportive of the State's commitment to provide greater than
minimal educational opportunities.' ° In this legislation, the General Assembly
first adopted the Foundation Program for financing its public schools, and
it granted authority to the State Board of Education to establish minimum
standards to be applied to all Ohio public schools "for the purpose of requiring a general education of high quality."'' The trial court also found
support in Connecticut's identical Thorough and Efficient Clause which the
Connecticut Supreme Court interpreted as requiring more than adequate
or minimal standards in establishing equal educational opportunities for
all students.'
After reviewing the evidence in light of the standard required by
165 Board of Educ. of Cincinnati v. Walter, No. A 7602725, slip. op.
'IN
167

Id. at 358-88.
107 Ohio St. 287, 297-98 (1923).

8 148 Ohio St. 342, 358-59 (1947).
169 Board of Educ. of Cincinnati v. Walter, No. A 7602725, slip op. at 365.
0

Id. at 68. See also OHIo REv. Coi.E ANN. § 3301.07 (Page 1972).
I'l Board of Educ. of Cincinnati v. Walter, No. A 7602725, slip op. at 371.
7
2 2 Id.at 366-68.
17
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Ohio's Thorough and Efficient Clause, the trial found that the General
Assembly had absolutely failed to carry out its duty Under this clause.
It found, therefore, that the entire present funding system, due to its substantial disparities and inequities, clearly violated the thorough and efficient
clause.'" Some of the problems with the current system that the court
relied on for its finding included the following: 7"
1. The numerous school closings that became necessary in 1976 and
1977 causing students to suffer irreparable educational deficits.
2. The majority of Ohio school districts which operate under conditions of educational deprivation.
3. The vast disparities of total state and local support received by
each district resulting in further disparities in expenditures for
education, and varying quantities and qualities of educational
services. The court noted the fact that a majority of Ohio students
receive only substandard educational services, thereby resulting in
a lack of equality of educational opportunity.
4. The collapse of the current local tax program, which provides
60% of the total revenue, due to the program's dependence on
voter referendum.
5. The unfair distribution of the Save Harmless Provisions to affluent
school districts.
6. The penalties imposed upon poor districts for lacking the funds
to meet statutory mandates for teacher/pupil ratios, and for
teachers' qualifications.
7. The inability of school districts under the current financing plan
to predict future revenues adequately enough to determine the
programs of curriculum and staffing needs for future years.
8. The fact that due to disparities in property wealth among districts,
a mill raises more educational revenue in some districts than in
others. Thus, a "taxpayer who pays taxes on property located in
districts wherein it is necessary to levy more than 20 mills in order
to provide an education of high quality appears to be bearing a
disproportionately heavy burden for public education. The evidence
also shows that property taxpayers in certain districts are so overburdened by nongovernmental costs that they are unable to withstand the financial strain of supporting educational costs to the
extent that educational interests require.""
Although the trial court held Ohio's Foundation Program unconiTS Id. at
1741d. at

370-72.
371.
1?5 Id. at 356.
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stitutional as a violation of the thorough and efficient clause, the court
of appeals refused to employ this clause as a basis for unconstitutionality.""
The appellate court returned to the Ohio Constitution's wording and
reasoned that since the power to establish a thorough and efficient school
system was expressly granted to Ohio's General Assembly, the power was
plenary; therefore, the trial court had overstepped its authority in ruling
the Foundation Program unconstitutional."
The court differentiated between the situation where a legislature fails to act and one wherein a
legislature acts by exercising its discretion. 1'7 8 The court indicated that the
first situation would be grounds for a court to intervene, while the second
would not. ' 9 Here the appellate court held that the Ohio General Assembly
had enacted a financing program which, in its discretion, provides a
thorough and efficient school system. The appellate court would not permit
the trial court to attempt to remedy a situation which by mandate of the
Ohio Constitution is adjustable only by the legislature."A Noting the trial
court's reliance on Miller v. Korns " as authority for ruling the Foundation
Program a violation of the thorough and efficient clause, the court of
appeals pointed out that the trial court was relying on dictum, and that
Miller contained an excerpt directly on point as to the deference the judiciary should pay to the legislature in matters of public school finance.
The Miller opinion quoted, and relied on the following excerpt from Sawyer
v. Gilmore:"2
The particular method of distribution rests in the wise discretion and
sound judgment of the Legislature. The Constitution provides no
regulation in this matter and it is not for the court to say that one
method should be adopted in preference to another. We are not to
substitute our judgment for that of a coordinate branch of the government working within its constitutional limits. 8 '
Although the court of appeals has rejected a challenge to the Ohio
Foundation Plan based on the thorough and efficient clause, the viability
of this argument has not been extinguished. The appellate court relied
only on its own interpretation of the clause's wording plus its application
of the Miller case, an Ohio Supreme Court case which seems equally
adaptable to an argument in support of the thorough and efficient clause
as the trial court applied it. Also, the application of an identical thorough
and efficient clause by the New Jersey Supreme Court as a valid basis
T

176 10 Ohio Op. 3d at 32-34.
"27 d.

1"8 Id.at 33.
ITO Id.

180 Id. at 32-34.
181
182

107 Ohio St. 287 (1923).

109 Me. 169, 83 At. 673 (1912).

183 Miller v. Korns, 107 Ohio St. 287, 301 (1923).
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for invalidating New Jersey's similar school finance system is a strong
factor to consider in determining what interpretation to place on Ohio's
Although not controlling in Ohio, New
thorough and efficient clause.'
Jersey's ruling adds support and precedent to the viability of the use of
the thorough and efficient clause as an employable device in challenging
Ohio's Foundation Program.
In reference to the scope of the legislature's duty under the New
Jersey's Thorough and Efficient Clause, the New Jersey Supreme Court
in Robinson v. Cahill8' states: "Whether the State acts directly or imposes the role upon local government, the end product must be what the
Constitution commands. A system of instruction in any district of the
State which is not thorough and efficient falls short of the constitutional
command."' 88 Thus, New Jersey's Supreme Court interpreted the thorough
and efficient clause's mandate to permit review of a legislature's funding
program by the state courts to determine whether such funding program
meets the requirements of the constitution. The recent New York case of
Levittown Union Free School District v. Nyquist"'s also adopts the Robinson
interpretation. In this case, the Nassau County Supreme Court used New
York's education clause as additional grounds for review of the legislature's
funding program by the state courts. 8 The court held that the education
clause imposed the duty on the state to distribute educational funds on
the basis of the educational needs of the students in each district, so as
to achieve the constitutional guarantee to all children of equal opportunity
to acquire basic minimal educational skills.", The court indicated that
failure of the state to carry out its duty would amount to the equivalent
of excluding "many underachieving pupils from the educational program. 9190
This New York case is very similar to the Ohio case in the type
of funding programs attacked"' and the similar problems that develop as
a result of implementation of the programs."' The New York funding
184

An interpretation of Miller v. Korns that is in agreement with the trial court's interpreta-

tion can be found in OHIO PUBLIC SCHOOL
185 62 N.J. 473, 303 A.2d 273 (1973).

FINANCE, REPORT

No. 106 (Oct. 1977).

8

2 6 Id. at 513, 303 A.2d at 294.
1S7 408 N.Y.S.2d 606 (Nassau County Super. Ct., June 23, 1978).

188 Id. at 642-43.
189 Id.
at 643.
191 Both states have foundation programs with save harmless provisions. New York, however,
has a flat grant provision which Ohio's program does not have. See Levittown Union Free
School Dist. v. Nyquist, 408 N.Y.S.2d 606, 613-14 (Nassau County Super Ct., June 23,
190 Id.

1978).
192 Both plans result in disparities in per pupil expenditures among districts. Both funding
programs rely heavily on the property weath of each district which varies greatly among

districts. Both plans result in great disparities among districts as to personnel, facilities, and
equipment. All of these factors combine to create great disparities in the overall educational
quality among the districts.
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under its education clause, but
system was held unconstitutional not only
193
clause.
protection
equal
its
also under
Thus, the current trend by state courts seems to be to employ the
education clauses of their state constitutions as additional bases for evaluating the constitutionality of education funding programs. This trend will
be a significant factor in the Ohio Supreme Court's evaluation of the
Walters case.
The second basis which the Ohio Supreme Court will consider in
determining the constitutionality of Ohio's Foundation Program is the equal
protection provision found in Article 1, Section 2 of the Ohio Constitution.
Both lower courts found the Foundation Program to be unconstitutional
under an equal protection analysis.9 The trial court determined that
education is a fundamental right guaranteed by Article VI, Section 2 of
Ohio's Constitution. This court proceeded to apply strict judicial scrutiny
to the foundation plan, and concluded that no compelling state interest
existed to justify the discrimination between Ohio's students that existed
as a result of implementation of the plan.19 In addition, the trial court
examined the Foundation Program under the traditional rational basis
test, and concluded that the plan failed under this less stringent test as
well. 190 The court rejected the defendant's rationale of the Foundation
Program's disparities as being necessary to maintain the desired state
objective of local control of the schools. 7 If found this rationale insufficient
to satisfy either the compelling state interest or the rational basis tests
for justifying the gross inequality of educational opportunity in Ohio.' 98
9 9
holding that
As precedent, the trial court relied on Serrano v. Priest's'
a school financing system is violative of equal protection guarantees if it
"makes the quality of a child's education a function of the wealth of
his parents or his neighbors,"" and that of Horton v. Meskil2 ° that the
desire for local control of education is not a compelling state interest
justifying substantial inequalities in educational opportunities among a
state's students. 2
In addition to the general Foundation Program, the Save Harmless
Provisions of Ohio's financing plan as well as its mandate provisions
193 408 N.Y.S.2d at 643-44.

194 Board of Educ. of Cincinnati v. Walter, No. A 7602725, slip. op. at 381; 10 Ohio Op.

3d at 36-37.
195 Board of Educ. of Cincinnati v. Walter, No. A 7602725, slip op. at 378.
196
197

Id.

Id. at 379-80.
198 Id.
199 18 Cal. 3d 728, 557 P.2d 929, 135 Cal. Rptr. 345 (1977).
290 Id. at 776, 557 P.2d at 957, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 373.
201 172 Conn. 615, 376 A.2d 359 (1977).
2 2
I at 648-49, 376 A.2d at 374-75.
1d.
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cere held violative of Ohio's equal protection clause. The Save Harmless
Provisions assure that no district receives less basic state aid than it rereceived during certain designated prior years, regardless of how many dollars
that district receives under the present system in total state and local
support and without regard to any factor of financial need in that school
district,"0 3 and the mandate provisions "impose penalties upon districts
for their inability to comply with statutory mandates concerning pupil/
teacher ratios and the number of service personnel they employ."2' ' Both
were held violative of Ohio's Equal Protection Clause.
The court of appeals agreed with the trial court that education is a
fundamental right under the Ohio Constitution, and applied strict scrutiny
to the situation.0 5 This appellate court concluded that no compelling state
interest existed to justify interfering with the fundamental right of Ohio
The court also rejected the interest in local
students to an education.'
control of education as a compelling state interest, stating:
The constitutional responsibility to provide for education rests with
the legislature, and we cannot perceive a compelling state interest
in local control which in effect thwarts the legislature in the exercise
of this responsibility. We believe that there are other methods of
financing the public school system which will maintain the salutory
features of local control without the disequalizing effects fostered by
the present system. Moreover, real property taxation seems a permissible ingredient of the funding system, as long as the state does
not overrely upon it. The guiding constitutional principle must be
equality of educational opportunity for all of the children of Ohio
rather than utilization of well intended but nevertheless miscarrying
formulae such as the wealth neutral plan or the "reward for effort"
program."0 7
Thus, the court of appeals, while not indicating what specific form an
acceptable finance program should take, did indicate possible guidelines
and principles for the legislature to consider and follow in formulating a
new program.
In view of the precedent cited, Ohio's equal protection clause seems
to be a sound basis for overruling Ohio's present Foundation Program.
While some states have refused to interpret their equal protection clauses
differently from the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of the
corresponding provision in the fourteenth amendment, New York's Levittown case seems to have resolved this conflict. While New York followed
203

20

4

2,0
206
207

Board of Educ. of Cincinnati v. Walter, No. A 7602725, slip op. at 383.
I.
d at 381.
10 Ohio Op. 3d at 35-36.
Id. at 36.

Id.
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the Roderiguez holding that education is not a fundamental right and
thus not subject to strict judicial scrutiny, the Nassau County Supreme
Court has held the New York public school financing program violative
of the state equal protection clause by applying a rational basis test.
The funding program in New York, as previously mentioned, is very
similar to Ohio's program. In addition, both plans were initiated with the
purpose of providing state aid to equalize the varying financial capabilities
of the state's school districts, which in turn would equalize the educational
opportunity for all students. In operation, unfortunately, both systems
failed to achieve their purposes, resulting instead in large disparities in
per pupil expenditure. The programs place great reliance on property
values which vary greatly from district to district, and additionally fail
to consider the unique characteristics and financial needs of each district,
including the differing cost of living levels, the unique educational needs
of students in each district, the variance in the quality of facilities and
equipment located in each district, and the differing needs for transportation. The case is similar to the Walters case in another way. Both cases
stress the extreme disparity of educational opportunity that exists between
students in large cities and students in rural or suburban areas by concentrating attention on the unique problems and characteristics of the urban
school districts.
Thus, even if the Ohio Supreme Court chooses to interpret Ohio's
equal protection clause in compliance with Rodriguez, thereby terminating
implementation of the stricter compelling state interest requirement, the
court can still apply the rational basis test to Ohio's Foundation Program.
Also it is interesting to keep in mind that under application of this lesser
standard by the trial court, Ohio's Foundation Program failed to withstand the equal protection challenges.
Therefore, a challenge to Ohio's public school financing program
under the equal protection provisions of the Ohio Constitution appears
to be sound.
WHAT IS WRONG WITH OHIO'S PLAN?

Regardless of the Ohio Supreme Court's decision in Board of Education of Cincinnati v. Walters,"8 the Ohio schools are not in a sound financial
position. Some school districts have been forced to close, some have been
saved only by applying to the State's emergency loan fund, and others
fail to meet the State's own minimum standards for educational services.
Although the present system of school financing was implemented for the
purpose of reducing wealth disparities between districts, the system as
presently operating has not worked.
208

Board of Educ. of Cincinnati v. Walter, No. A 7602725, slip op.
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The primary problem in Ohio is that the level of funding is inadequate. The guaranteed yield under Ohio's present program is simply not
high enough to provide an adequate education. Therefore, this level of
funding is not sufficient at the present time regardless of the lack of provision in the formula for adjusting for inflation. Regardless of the formula
chosen for expending State aid, there are simply not enough dollars put
into the system to provide the quantity and quality of educational services
required. Expert testimony in Walters indicated that between $1,589 and
$1,941 per pupil was needed in 1976 to provide the quality and quantity
of education necessary for a high quality of education throughout the
state." 9 Even when fully funded, the current system will only guarantee
$960 per pupil to those districts taxing at twenty mills, and another $420
where the voters of the district agree to tax themselves an additional ten
mills. The "[e]qualization of the state's resources which are now comsecondary education would
mitted to financing public elementary and
2 10
result only in the equalization of poverty.
Although proponents of district power equalizing (DPE) have considered voter willingness a proper element in determining the quality of
education, the Hamilton County Common Pleas Court agreed with
critics of DPE that voter willingness cannot control the quality of education within this state."' Whether this decision is upheld by the state
supreme court or not, if all of the school districts in Ohio are to provide
a high quality of education, adequate funds must be provided without
dependency upon voter approval. The "reward for effort provision" is
simply inequitable to the children involved as an element for determining
basic state aid.
Third, the present system does not provide for spiraling inflationary
costs. The present property tax requirement of freezing local revenues
has the opposite effect upon a school district's ability to increase its
revenues along with inflation. Furthermore, the state program itself does
not adjust for inflationary costs.
Although taxpayer pressures to provide tax relief have resulted in
the local property tax-freeze provisions, such provisions have left school
districts in the position of needing greater revenues due to the rising costs
of business without any means of obtaining such increases, and without
additional voter approval of tax levy increases previously voted upon.
Fourth, Ohio's program does not consider the differing needs of
children throughout the State in providing its present distribution program.
2

09

ld. at 307-10.

210 Id. at 303.
211 Id.
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School districts vary as to the proportion of disadvantaged and handicapped students, those needing vocational training, and transportation
factors.
'
although politically desirFifth, the "Save Harmless Guarantees,"2 12
able for preserving wealthy district support of the financing system, have
resulted in continuing disparities between wealthy and poor districts.
Funds needed to equalize poor districts have continued to be provided
to wealthy districts which admittedly could operate adequate school
systems without any State aid at all.

Sixth, the Formula does not contain provisions to adjust for differences in operating costs throughout the state. As a result, high cost districts have not been able to provide the same services as a lower cost
district at the same level of revenue attainment.
Seventh, the present financial system neither guarantees the same yield
as that obtained by the wealthiest district at a given rate, nor provides
for recapture provisions. Without either of these provisions, the districts
cannot provide equal resources at the same millage rate. Although absolute
equality has not been designated a goal of Ohio's school finance system,
the present system allows some Ohio school children to receive more than
five times the financial resources as others within the state."'3 The ten
districts with the greatest property wealth per pupil can each raise more
than $60 per pupil with each mill of property tax. The wealthiest district can raise $230 per pupil per mill. The ten poorest districts can raise
less than $10 per pupil with each mill. The absence of a recapture provision perpetuates these disparities. Participation in the state system would
have to be mandatory, or the wealthiest districts would opt out of the
program since they would receive nothing from the State. Regardless of
the manner in which recapture is structured in absolute terms or as a
function of a maximum variable ratio, wealthy districts will balk at this
type of provision.
Eighth, the adjustment provisions penalize districts which are unable
or refuse to provide sufficient classroom teachers and educational service
personnel.
Ninth, no consideration has been given to personal income of the
residents residing in the district. Such consideration is necessary to ascertain
whether the districts has high income residents who can afford high millage
rates or low income residents who need some type of property tax relief.
New York's statute also contains Save Harmless provisions which were declared unconstitutional in Board of Educ. of Levittown v. Nyquist, 408 N.Y.S.2d 606 (1978).
213 Board of Educ. of Cincinnati v. Walter, No. A 7602725, slip op.
212
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Tenth, property tax inequities in administration, tax-freeze laws, and
lack of coordination with income exist. If the property tax is to be retained as a means of financing the schools, the inadequacies in administration, the tax-freeze provisions, and the lack of coordination with income
must be eliminated.
How

CAN OHIO SOLVE ITS FINANCIAL PROBLEMS?

Other States' Solutions
Recent studies indicate that it is not the form which the state plan
takes, but the infusion of additional dollars into the system which controls
the reduction of disparities between school districts within a state.2""
Quoting one study:
The States used a variety of mechanisms, and no one formula can
be identified as a preferred or more effective vehicle for reform. Although the presence of rigid rate or levy ceilings appeared to be
somewhat associated with reduced education disparities, it is equally
clear that in most states a more important factor contributing to
meaningful reform was the commitment of additional resources for
A.

education. Without additional funds, any reform other than resource

distribution seems to have been virtually impossible.215

The states which are generally considered reform states216 have
adopted a variety of programs some of which focus upon providing property tax relief, some with equalizing wealth disparities within the districts,
others focus primary emphasis upon recognizing individual needs of the
districts, and others have simply increased the states' share.
Although leading reformers across the nation have advocated full
state funding programs, other than Hawaii, no state has gone this far
in implementing its state aid program.
Full state funding would satisfy even the strictest of constitutional
standards whether "uniformity" or "thorough and efficient," as stated in
Ohio's Constitution. 17
The New Jersey Constitution mandates a "thorough and efficient"
system of free public schools, just as does that of Ohio. Following the
court's decision in Robinson v. Cahill,"' the state enacted a Public School
214See
215 Id.
216

A.

School Finance Reform, supra note 91.

at 77.
ODDEN,

OVERVIEW

J.

AUGENBLICK

& P.

VINCENT, SCHOOL FINANCE REFORM IN THE STATE:

OF LEGISLATIVE ACTIONS,

JUDICIAL

DECISIONS, AND

(1976).

See U.S. OFFICE OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND
gorization of state constitutional requirements.
227

218

WELFARE,

AN

PUBLIC POLICY RESEARCH

supra note 86, at 6-7 for cate-

62 N.J. 473, 303 A.2d 273 (1973).
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Education Act of 1975.219 Although the new law which essentially involves a guaranteed equalized value per pupil contains extensive Save
Harmless Provisions, cost factors were introduced which provide additional aid guarantees to special needs pupil populations; spending limits
were introduced; and most importantly, specific goals and standards for
meeting the thorough and efficient clause were legislatively defined. The
Legislature established goals and standards as well as guidelines within
which to operate.2 2 Furthermore, the state provided for a periodic review
and update of state goals and standards."
Minnesota enacted legislation which raised the foundation support
to a level approximately equal to the statewide average pupil expenditure. 2
This plan provided for save harmless provisions, unlimited leeway options
for raising revenue, and additional weightings provided for each Aid to
Families of Dependent Children (AFDC) pupil. Data collected in one
study indicate that "high wealth districts were the principal gainers in
school resources."2 2 One offered explanation was that central city districts
which have a larger number of AFDC pupils are also high property
wealth districts.22 '
Florida's education financing program has shown progress towards
equalization.22 The legislative purpose was "to guarantee to each student
in the Florida public educational system the availability of programs and
services appropriate to his/her educational needs which are substantially
equal to those available to any similar student notwithstanding geographic
Pupil weights, locadifferences and varying local economic factors."' '
tional features, and a lid on the amount of leeway dollars which can be
raised locally are all characteristics of Florida's finance program.
21
Another state reducing educational disparities is New Mexico.
Distributions are made to local school districts in three parts: a state
equalizing guarantee distribution, a transportation distribution, and a
supplemental distribution. Optional local leeway levies are not allowed. The
state's equalization guarantee distribution is the "[a]mount of money distributed to each school district to ensure that the school district's operating
is at least equal to
revenue, including its local and federal revenues ....
219 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18 A:7a (West Supp. 1978).

220d. at § 18 A:7a-4.
221 Id. at § 18 A:7a-7.
222 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 124.212 (West 1979).
22
3 School Finance Reform, supra note 91, at 91.

24 Id.
225 Id. at 81.
226 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 236.012 (West Supp. 1979).
227 N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-8-1 (1978).
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'
The result is that New Mexico's
the school district's program cost."228
program has helped the lowest wealth districts. 2

Prior to formulating a new program, it is interesting to note and
important to keep in mind, how other state courts have reacted to their various
new programs. For instance, Wisconsin enacted a new school finance program
with a district power equalization factor based on the property value of
each school district and containing a negative-aid provision, whereby the
districts in which per pupil property value was greater than the guaranteed
standard set by the state were required to pay the excess property tax into
a state general fund, and this in turn was to be distributed to other school
districts. 3 ' The purpose of the negative-aid provision was to overcome
the disparity in property value among districts. However, in Buse v. Smith,"'
the Wisconsin Supreme Court held the negative-aid provisions to be in
violation of another Wisconsin constitutional provision, the uniform taxation
provision. Since the means which were chosen to achieve the fundamental
state right of an equal educational opportunity were themselves violative
of another state constitutional provision, the financing program was held
unconstitutional. Thus, it may be necessary to draft any recapture provisions of a funding program carefully in consideration of any state uniformity of taxation clauses. While states differ in their interpretations of
these uniformity clauses, "unlike Wisconsin, most courts . . .consider that
the uniformity rule applies only to the raising of taxes and not to the dis23 2
tribution of the proceeds.
Another challenge to a new state funding program arose in Kansas
through the case of Knowles v. Smith."' The new funding program, which
was based on a district power equalizing formula, resulted in discrimination as to various districts due to the restricted definition the funding
program applied to the term "district wealth." The program was held
invalid by a trial court because the program violated the Equal Protection
Clause of the fourteenth amendment, Section 1 of the Kansas Bill of Rights,
and two state provisions for uniform taxation and the uniform operation
of state laws. No rational basis was found for the classifications. By the
time the case reached the Kansas Supreme Court, the Legislature had
amended the program and the case was remanded for review once again
at the trial level.
These cases illustrate the need for new funding programs to be care228

School Finance Reform, supra note 91, at 94.

229

Id.

20

WIs. STAT. ANN. §§ 121.07, 121.08 (West 1973).

23174 Wis. 2d 550, 247 N.W.2d 141 (1976).
2
S2 Levin, Current Trends in School Finance Reform Litigation: A Commentary, 1977 DuKE
L.J. 1099, 1132 (1977).
233 219 Kan. 271, 547 P.2d 699 (1976).
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fully drafted and implemented in order to avoid additional constitutional
challenges to these programs which would cause not only substantial legal
expense, but significant time delays and setbacks for the state's educational
system and for the students as well.
B. Ohio's Solution - More Money.
Although full state funding would assure equality throughout the
state, such would require either a statewide property tax, or at least the
doubling of the income or sales taxes within the state. 3 , Those in the
legislature who favor traditional ideas of local control would strongly
oppose such a plan, and such a plan would most likely be unpopular.
Since at this point such has not been constitutionally required, the likelihood of passage of this type of provision in Ohio appears remote. Although the Ohio School Boards Association, the Education Review Committee of the Ohio General Assembly, the Governor2 35 and the State
Board of Education have all made recommendations for legislative consideration, none have suggested full state funding. Numerous commentators,
however, have recognized full state funding as the best method for the
future, and have pointed out that local control and full state funding are
not inconsistent." 6 Full state financing requires that revenue collection
occur at the state level, and distribution to local school districts at the
state level. It does not require control over day to day operations at the
state level.
If the concept of full state funding is temporarily rejected, the State
is still plagued with the problem of how to finance the schools, and how
to eliminate the inequities of the present equal yield program.
The legislature must first define the goals and standards of equality
the State must meet in order to provide a thorough and efficient system.
The question is whether there are workable solutions which will solve the
constitutional problem, as well as assure that every school district will
meet the State Board of Education's own minimum requirements with a
financing program composed of state and local funds. If a combination
of state and local funds is to be used, Ohio must obtain funds to adequately
fund the system so that each pupil in every district can be assured that
sufficient dollars will be spent on his/her behalf to allow the district to
meet the Board of Education's own minimum requirements of the legislative set standards. Regardless of the form taken to distribute state aid,
additional state revenues must be raised. Several possibilities are available
including raising the state income tax,"3 the sales tax, introducing a value
23

4 ADEQUATE & EQUITABLE FUNDING, supra note 135, at 3.
See GOVERNOR J. RHODES, supra note 102.
236 A. ODDEN, supra note 216, at 52; see also Alternative Reforms, supra note 91.
23 5

237

Board of Educ. of Cincinnati v. Walter, No. A 7602725, slip op. at 353,
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added tax, or establishing a public school tax fund as suggested by a
committee of the Ohio School Boards Association.2 38 This latter suggestion
would involve commercial, industrial, and public utility property being
taxed by the State, rather than by the local district in which it is located.
Reforms needed in the revenue raising area in regard to the property
tax area include "circuit breaker" provisions to give property tax relief
where needed,2 39 revamping the property tax collection system," ' and
repeal of the property tax-freeze provisions.24 1
On the distribution side, Ohio must eliminate the "reward for effort"
provisions of the current program. Regardless of whether the system
operates as a foundation plan, an equal yield plan, or a per pupil allocation plan,"2 each district must be guaranteed adequate funds if it applies
the specific tax rate. Receipt of State funds, however, should not depend
on local tax effort." ' Additionally, each district should receive the same
State aid to which it would be otherwise entitled if it were levying the
required millage. The adjustment provisions which penalize a district for
failure to comply with certain personnel standards should also be eliminated. The effects of inflation, costs of doing business differentials, and
the differing needs of children in the district must be accounted for by
the distribution system. Finally, Save Harmless Guarantees should be
eliminated so that districts not requiring State aid are not receiving it.
In conclusion, the future of Ohio's public school system depends not
on what constitutional challenges the present financing system can meet, but
on the Ohio legislature's realization that the present system is inequitable.
Bold legislative action is required to solve the school financial problems.
Only by providing additional funds and ignoring regional priorities can
the finance program provide the type of educational objectives that all
the students of this state deserve. 4'
LINDA

L. ROBISON

AND
Lois YODER
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ADEQUATE &

EQUITABLE

FuNDING, supra note 135, at 6. See also E. Strong, A New Idea

for School Financing, BUCKEYE FARM NEWS 36 (Jan. 1978).
239 GovERNoR J. RHODES, supra note 102, at 2.

240 See, e.g., Omo FAIR TAx INITIATIVE PROPOSAL (materials received from Ohio Rep. John
E. Johnson) which would create a personal income tax credit for taxes on real property exceeding 2.5% of income.
241
See ADEQUATE & EQUITABLE FUNDING, supra note 135.
242 OHmo STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION, supra note 131, at 2.
243 Proposed Senate Bill No. 59 retains this provision which was declared unconstitutional by
the lower court in the slip opinion of Board of Education of Cincinnati.
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While this Comment was at the press, the Ohio Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality
of the statutory system established by the General Assembly for the financing of public
education. See Board of Education of Cincinnati v. Walter, 58 Ohio St. 2d 368, 390 N.E.2d
813 (1979).
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